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Under the prevailing model of copyright liability for user-generated content, right 
holders and intermediaries are both involved in the enforcement of exclusive rights 
on the Internet.  While right holders are expected to identify and notify the infringing 
content that they wish to remove, the intermediaries have to react by assessing the 
received notices and taking appropriate action, including taking the information 
“down” from the service in case it is infringing.  This “notice and takedown” system, 
championed by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, became a model for many 
countries around the world.  However, in the last few years, the right holders have 
begun to advocate for a fundamental re-design of the system.  According to the 
number of initiatives, some of the right holders would prefer that intermediaries not 
only take down the notified content but also prevent its re-appearance in the future.  
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This alternative model, often dubbed “notice and staydown,” is currently proposed 
by the European Commission as part of its upcoming copyright reform.  If successful, 
it will constitute a huge change for the existing global online environment. 
This article scrutinizes the potential switch from notice and takedown policy 
(“NTD”) to notice and staydown policy (“NSD”) in order to answer two important 
questions:  (1) What are the (economic) costs and benefits of two policy options and 
how do they compare?  (2) Is NSD really superior in delivering better tools for 
automation?  The overall goal of the paper is to offer general policy guidance for 
national or regional policymakers currently considering such policy change. 
This article concludes that algorithmic enforcement is inevitable and, under some 
conditions, socially desirable.  First, high-quality automation of copyright 
enforcement that produces negligible enforcement errors offers many opportunities 
for improvement of the status quo and therefore should be embraced and 
incentivized.  Second, to make such automation a reality, we need to push innovation 
in the right direction by conditioning acceptance of algorithmically generated notices 
upon their quality.  Third, an enhanced notice and takedown framework can promote 
such automation better than notice and staydown.  It provides for stronger market 
incentives for the development of new filtering technologies and allows area-by-area 
deployment as the technologies improve.  Last, as a consequence, enhanced NTD 
can become a superior policy option from a social perspective.  However, in order to 
realize these benefits, some changes to the NTD framework are required, too.  These 
could take the form of standardized submission formats or interfaces for robo-notices 
that come with quality conditions and effective sanctions to enforce them. 
INTRODUCTION 
Sir Paul McCartney, Lady Gaga, Taylor Swift and U2—these are just a few of 
almost 200 artists who recently urged the U.S. Congress to revisit the existing notice 
and takedown (“NTD”) policy in its copyright law.  The proposal they endorse is 
often dubbed “notice and staydown” (“NSD”).1  One petition of artists formulated 
their plea to the Congress as follows: 
 Small independent film makers spend their time not making movies, but sending 
out 50,000 take down notices in a vain attempt to sweep aside the tide of recurrent 
copyright infringement.  We need to change the laws to make sure that artists spend 
their time making art, not sending take down notices. 
 It is time that a take down notice be sent once, and only once.  Thereafter it should 
be the duty of the website to prevent the reposting of the same material. The technology 
to do this is available.  What is lacking is the legal directive to use this technology to 
prevent the wholesale theft of artistic creations.2 
 
 1. See U.S. Copyright Office, Section 512 Study:  Notice and Request for Public Comment, 80 
Fed. Reg. 81865 (Dec. 31, 2015); Elliot Harmon, “Notice and Staydown” is Really “Filtering 
Everything,” ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 21, 2016), https://perma.cc/X3AA-CPQA.  
 2. See TAKE DOWN AND STAY DOWN (2016), https://perma.cc/NQ3F-9CJG (accessed by 
searching for takedownstaydown.org in the Internet Archive Index). 
HUSOVEC, THE PROMISES OF ALGORITHMIC COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 53 (2018) 
2018] THE PROMISES OF ALGORITHMIC COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT 55 
In the European Union, the copyright holders are also pursuing a similar agenda 
under the banner of so called “value gap.”3  Value gap attacks notice and takedown 
from a different perspective.  It does not focus on the enforcement inefficiency of the 
system.  Rather, it argues that the system allows platforms to enjoy unlicensed 
content without paying royalties and gives these platforms a superior bargaining 
position in case they show willingness to license on behalf of their users.  As will be 
explained, the European Commission’s recent proposal for copyright reform adopts 
staydown obligation against the background of these arguments.  
The initiatives in the United States and the European Union frame intermediaries,  
not the right holders, as responsible for continuous identification of the infringing 
content.  In the literature, a number of objections were raised against NSD, including 
that it disproportionately interferes with fundamental human rights.4  Naturally, if 
NSD is against human rights law, then it cannot be legislated at all, regardless of any 
efficiencies that might be gained.  This Article does not enter this debate, but rather 
explores those claimed “efficiencies” offered by NSD.  For the sake of the argument, 
this Article assumes that NSD is permissible to legislate and considers the policy 
choice.  So doing, this paper unpacks the often-argued promises associated with the 
switch from NTD to NSD policy in order to see how strong and well-founded they 
are.  The overall goal of this paper is to offer general policy guidance for national or 
regional policymakers currently considering such policy change. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  First, it explains the two enforcement models.  
Second, it provides in-depth rationalization of various policy choices, including some 
fundamental enforcement economics, and explains how automation fits these 
debates.  Third, it scrutinizes the potential switch from NTD policy to NSD policy in 
order to answer two questions:  (1) What are the costs and benefits of the two policy 
options and how do they compare?  (2) Is NSD really superior in delivering better 
tools for automation?  Finally, it concludes with a counter-intuitive result.  If 
governments want to encourage high-quality automation, instead of prescribing it, 
they should just modify NTD, and the market surrounding such scheme will take care 
of the rest.  
 
 3. Video by the Int’l Fed’n of the Phonographic Indus., Fixing the Value Gap, IFPI.COM,  
https://perma.cc/HD9D-8EZD  (last visited Aug. 1, 2018). 
 4. For the debate, see General Opinion on the EU Copyright Reform Package, EUROPEAN 
COPYRIGHT SOCIETY (Jan. 24, 2017),  https://perma.cc/ZHR9-LLGE.  See also Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon 
et al., Open Letter to the European Commission—On the Importance of Preserving the Consistency and 
Integrity and of the EU Acquis Relating to Content Monitoring Within the Information Society (Sept. 30, 
2016), https://perma.cc/9ZHM-6Z3Z (against); CREATe, Open Letter on the EU Copyright Reform 
Proposals for the Digital Age to members of the European Parliament and the European Council, 
CREATE.AC.UK (Feb. 24, 2017),  https://perma.cc/L45T-LLJ9; for argument in favor, see Association 
Littéraire et Artistique Internationale, Résolution Relative aux Propositions Européenes du 14 Septembre 
2016, ALAI.ORG (Feb. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/JC9Q-ZKL7.  The argument concerning human rights 
is that the Court of Justice of the European Union previously found identical or equivalent schemes to 
infringe numerous fundamental rights in its case law.  The opponents, on the other hand, argue that the 
proposed scheme either differs, or offers more safeguards than the leadings cases.  Alternatively, one 
could also argue that the CJEU would assess a legislator-imposed filtering differently than injunction-
imposed filtering. 
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I. TAXONOMY OF ENFORCEMENT MODELS 
Under today’s prevailing model of intermediary liability, right holders and 
intermediaries are both involved in the enforcement of exclusive rights on the 
Internet.  While right holders are expected to identify and notify the infringing 
content that they wish to remove, the intermediaries have to react by assessing the 
received notices and taking appropriate action, including taking the information 
“down” from the service in case it is infringing.  This “notice and takedown” system, 
championed by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, became a model for many 
countries around the world.5 
NTD refers to a two-stage online enforcement process, where right holders are 
expected to identify and notify the content, and intermediaries to review notifications 
and act upon them if the content is unlawful.  The system is a compromise between 
an effective system of enforcement of right holder’s rights on the one hand, and 
freedom of expression of users and platform’s ability to innovate on the other.  NTD 
surely is not the only possible allocation of responsibilities.  
As an alternative to NTD, one can imagine systems with strict liability, under 
which intermediaries compensate right holders for any user-committed infringement, 
and zero liability, where any enforcement is left to the voluntary action of an 
intermediary.6  In addition, the NTD system itself can come in variations, such as 
with formal conditions being imposed on a notice, mandatory takedown following 
fulfillment of formal conditions, conditional counter-notice, or obligatory court-
approved notification.7  These conditions greatly influence the design and outcomes 
of the system.  Any NTD-based system can hardly be evaluated without taking these 
design-features into account. 
NSD is yet another alternative.  Unlike NTD, it is not a continuous two-stage two-
person process.  In its typical form, it requires that right holders only send a single 
notification regarding a particular protected object (e.g. a copyrighted work), which 
then triggers a time-limited obligation to prevent re-infringing on the right to the 
same object.  However, even the NSD can have variations.  The variations depend 
on the scope of such preventive obligation.  Unlike so called “repeat infringer” 
obligations, which require terminating access or accounts to repeated offenders on a 
service, one prior infringement within an NSD model creates an obligation on the 
service to prevent it towards all its user-base, and not just the implicated user.  In 
 
 5. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, codified as amended 
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201–1205, 1301–1332 and 28 U.S.C. § 4001.  For leading studies of the legislation, 
see Daniel Seng, The State of the Discordant Union: An Empirical Analysis of DMCA Takedown Notices, 
18 VA. J.L. TECH. 369 (2013); Niva Elkin-Koren, Fair Use by Design, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1082 (2017). 
 6. Under Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 §§ 41.25, 41.26, 41.27(3) (Can.), Canadian Internet 
service providers and Internet storage service providers are not required to remove or disable infringing 
content, although they may do so voluntarily, and a copyright owner will still be required to invoke other 
legal remedies.  See Borden L. Gervais, Canada’s New Notice and Notice Regime for Internet Copyright 
Infringement, BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS (Nov. 8, 2014), https://perma.cc/E9H8-Y72A. 
 7. For another taxonomy, see Christina Angelopoulos & Stijn Smet, Notice-and-Fair-Balance:  
How to Reach a Compromise Between Fundamental Rights in European Intermediary Liability, 8 J. 
MEDIA L. 266 (2016). 
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other words, it does not limit preventive obligation to the same perpetrator.  
Depending on the scope of preventive “staydown” obligation, it might require an 
intermediary to protect from re-infringing only (1) in the same form (e.g. re-
uploading of an identical file with a full copyrighted work), or (2) in any other form 
(e.g. re-uploading a part of the work).  This Article assumes that NSD would usually 
mean the latter, i.e. an obligation to prevent any form of infringement concerning the 
identical work infringed in the past.  What it does not view as NSD, on the other 
hand, is when an obligation to prevent is imposed without requiring a single notice 
to be sent.  Such a liability scheme, from a legal and economic standpoint, equals 
pure strict liability, while NSD can be, under some conditions, still perceived as a 
rule of negligence.8 
A. NOTICE AND TAKEDOWN 
Most of the legislative regimes of intermediary liability today, such as the 
American DMCA, European E-Commerce Directive and Chinese Tort Law,9 follow 
a broadly defined notice and takedown model of online enforcement.  This means 
that right holders are expected to identify and notify, while intermediaries are 
expected to evaluate and act upon notifications.  The models differ in many respects, 
so they often represent different versions of NTD.  
In the European Union, the E-Commerce Directive does not mandate a single 
system because, within some boundaries, it allows the Member States to come up 
with their own procedures.10  In the United States, on the other hand, the federal law 
prescribes each step of the notification and takedown process in a fairly detailed 
manner.11  A crucial difference between these two versions of NTD is that while the 
U.S. version requires takedown following fulfillment of some formal requirements,12 
the European system, at least on the Union level, does not prescribe any action.  It 
only incentivizes takedown by lifting the safe harbor immunities and exposure to 
domestic tort laws. 
 
 8. See also Giancarlo Frosio, The Death of ‘No Monitoring Obligations’:  A Story of Untameable 
Monsters, 8(3) J. INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. & E-COMM. L. 199 (2017); Giancarlo Frosio, From 
Horizontal to Vertical:  An Intermediary Liability Earthquake in Europe, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 
565 (2017) (discussing shift from negligence to strict liability regime; in my view, strict liability is not 
automatically a consequence of adopting NSD). 
 9. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201–1205, 1301–1332 and 28 U.S.C. § 4001; Council Directive 2000/31, 
2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC) [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive]; Tort Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010), 
https://perma.cc/P67W-35DC. The U.S. include safe harbors regularly into BTAs. See Daniel Seng, The 
State of the Discordant Union:  An Empirical Analysis of DMCA Takedown Notices, 18 VA. J.L. TECH. 
369, 373 (2013).  For an excellent comparative work, see Miquel Peguera, The DMCA Safe Harbors and 
Their European Counterparts:  A Comparative Analysis of Some Common Problems, 32 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 481 (2009). 
 10. Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, at 2, 6 (EC). 
 11. 17 U.S.C §§ 512(C)(3), 512(D)(1), 512(D)(3) (2006). 
 12. 17 U.S.C § 512(C)(3) (2006). 
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When comparing these two regimes and Chinese NTD systems, one can observe 
a number of differences.  The U.S. and Chinese systems codify the procedure, 
requiring fulfillment of particular elements,13 while European Union framework 
leaves it to the Member States if they do so. Most Member States do not specify such 
procedures.14  The U.S. and Chinese systems both acknowledge counter-notice 
procedure, while the EU system does not.  Some of the EU Member States, however, 
include it nevertheless in their statutory frameworks.15  In China, NTD does not 
require the assessment of whether the complained materials are actually infringing 
or not.16  The systems also define the reaction windows differently.  While the EU 
system relies on a general notion of a “diligent economic operator,”17 Chinese NTD 
interprets “immediate removal” on a case-by-case basis in the light of such factors 
as: method in sending the notice; accuracy of the notice; amount of infringing content 
indicated by the notice; difficulty in removing content or disabling access on the 
content; characteristics of the ISP.  These factors are open-ended and depend on the 
state of technology.18  
In terms of compensation for wrongful requests, the U.S. system is the most 
explicit.19  In the EU, such liability can usually also be derived according to the 
Member States’ laws, but seems rarely practiced.  On the other hand, Chinese laws 
explicitly foresee an obligation to compensate users when copyright holder’s request 
leads to a wrongfully removal of the material thereby causing it damage.20  
Moreover, the EU and U.S. versions of NTD also operate in a different external 
environment.  In the literature, any voluntary enforcement methods which are 
implemented by the intermediaries and go beyond the DMCA safe harbors are 
referred to as “DMCA-plus measures.”21  Unlike in the United States, where such 
measures are entirely voluntary, in the European Union some of the measures can be 
forced upon intermediaries by means of injunctions.22 
 
 13. Id.; Jie Wang, Regulating Hosting ISPs’ Responsibilities for Copyright Infringement:  The 
Freedom to Operate in the US, EU and China (Oct. 12, 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Maastricht 
University) (on file with Maastricht University), at 28. 
 14. Gerald Spindler et al., Study on the Liability of Internet Intermediaries, at 41 (2007), 
https://perma.cc/9KEG-GCD3.  An example of an EU country with such statutory procedure is France. 
See Loi 2004-575 du 21 Juin 2004 pour la confiance dans l’économie numérique [Law 2004-575 of June 
21, 2004 for Confidence in the Digital Economy], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE 
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 5, 2008, art. 6(I)(5). 
 15. Spindler et al., supra note 14, at 16.  
 16. Wang, supra note 13, at 171–72. 
 17. Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Intl. AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-06011, ¶ 124. 
 18. Wang, supra note 13, at 174. 
 19.  Although these situations seldom give rise to court cases in U.S. courts; but see Lenz v. 
Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 20. Wang, supra note 13, at 174.  
 21. Jennifer Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, UC Berkeley Public Law 
Research Paper No. 2755628 (2017), https://perma.cc/E4R5-UUCF.  See Annemarie Bridy, Copyright’s 
Digital Deputies:  DMCA-Plus Enforcement by Internet Intermediaries, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW (John A. Rothchild ed., 2016). 
 22. See generally MARTIN HUSOVEC, INJUNCTIONS AGAINST INTERMEDIARIES IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION:  ACCOUNTABLE BUT NOT LIABLE? (Cambridge Univ. Press 2017). 
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In the most typical scenario, if intermediaries receive a notification about an 
alleged infringement by a user, they generally have to act expeditiously to remove 
the content, or risk facing liability of their own.  In practice, there are a number of 
important dynamics.  First of all, notice submitters, e.g. music right holders, and their 
authorized enforcement agents may or may not engage in sufficient quality control 
of what they notify.  After their submission, all the notices are processed by the 
intermediaries; the extent and method of review is their choice.23  Theoretically, 
intermediaries could still completely limit the effects of over-notification by 
engaging in a thorough review of notices, thus taking down only infringing content.  
However, to evaluate each submitted notice, an intermediary has to first assess its 
legality and relevant facts, which is costly and often leads to uncertain outcomes.  
Moreover, intermediaries are risk-averse and evaluate notices with extreme caution 
because under-compliance can be punished by severe fines or a form of joint 
liability.24  The law thus creates strong incentives for over-blocking legitimate 
content by rational profit-maximizing entities.25  The entire ecosystem could be, in 
theory, still “saved” by concerned users who diligently counter-notify once their 
content is removed.  However, according to the empirical research, this is not 
happening.26  Last, even if these users whose content has been removed do complain, 
they often lack a credible remedy to reinstate the content.27  
One of the big problems of notice and takedown system is that its daily practice 
takes place entirely behind the closed doors.28  Although a number of providers in 
recent years started publishing so called “transparency reports,”29 these usually 
provide only aggregate data, which maybe illustrate the scale of the NTD system, but 
indicate nothing about its usefulness or social desirability.  The Lumen Project was 
conceived as a response to this problem.  The project collects requests to remove 
material from the web and makes the tool freely available to anyone.  In its effort, it 
relies on voluntary participation of providers.  Its biggest partner so far has been 
 
 23. See Martin Husovec, Accountable, Not Liable:  Injunctions Against Intermediaries, TILEC 
Discussion Paper No. 2016-012 (2016), https://perma.cc/2L2L-K4CE. 
 24. See Christina Angelopoulos, European Intermediary Liability in Copyright:  A Tort-Based 
Analysis, UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM 141 (Apr. 22, 2016), https://perma.cc/ER2H-73TX. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 12; Annemarie Bridy & Daphne Keller, U.S. Copyright Office Section 512 Study: 
Comments in Response to Second Notice of Inquiry 27–30 (Mar. 8, 2015),  https://perma.cc/7GYK-SG7A. 
 27. Effectively there is no obligation to put material back on the platform.  Even the U.S. counter-
notice procedure only offers incentives for intermediaries to reinstate the content (17 U.S.C § 512(g) 
(2006)).  Claims against over-removal have consistently failed before the U.S. courts, mostly based on 
contractual and other defenses.  See, e.g., Song fi, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 876 (N.D. Cal. 
2015); Lewis v. YouTube LLC, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 219 (2015); Sikhs for Justice “SFJ,” Inc. v. Facebook, 
Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2015), aff'd sub nom. Sikhs for Justice, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 697 
F. App'x 526 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 28. See Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering:  Beyond Disclosure in 
Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLA. L. REV. 181 (2017).  See also Rob Kitchin, Thinking Critically About 
and Researching Algorithms, 20 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 14 (2016). 
 29. Transparency Report: Copyright Notices for Jan.–June 2017, TWITTER, 
https://perma.cc/3H5P-LCP4; Tumblr Copyright and Trademark Transparency Report:  Jan.–June 2015, 
TUMBLR, https://perma.cc/LM43-9UQ9; Github’s 2014 Transparency Report, GITHUB (Apr. 16, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/Y58M-SYD9. 
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Google, though the partnership is limited in scope.  Any study of NTD in practice 
thus has to rely on few available methods:  (1) interviewing stakeholders;30 (2) 
experimental upload and subsequent notification of own content;31 (3) analysis of the 
Lumen data;32 and (4) tracking of public face of the services.33  
According to the existing studies, the notification landscape is dominated by 
corporations and businesses.  In Urban and Quilter’s 2006 study, corporations and 
business entities were the primary users of the system.  From the sample, 94% of 
notices were sent to mere conduits, 72% to hosting providers, and 79% to information 
location tool providers.34  Among the professional users of the system, the music 
industry is a dominant player.  In 2013, Seng found that BPI, IFPI, and RIAA 
accounted for 58.6% of all notices served from 2008 and 2012 in his sample.  To 
contrast this, he found the adult entertainment industry produced 19.8% and the 
movie industry sent 9.5% of the total number of notices.  If notice numbers were 
used as a proxy for measuring enforcement activity, we could conclude that six out 
of ten notices from the top fifty content providers pertain to music infringement.35  
However, the ecosystem is becoming increasingly dominated by enforcement agents. 
While in 2006, the Urban and Quilter study found that an absolute majority of the 
notifications were still sent directly by right holders (94% for hosting providers and 
98.5% for information location tools),36 more recent studies find the notification 
landscape has professionalized, with most of the work being done by enforcement 
agents.  This includes specialized rights enforcement organizations, trade 
associations, and—to a small extent—law firms.37  Urban and others found in their 
2016 study that 91.8% of takedown notices were sent by reporting agents with only 
7.5% coming directly from the rights holders.38  Similarly, Seng found that while 
reporting agents constituted 36.8% in 2008 in his sample, it increased to 59.6% by 
2012, focusing on top thirty reporters.39  Of this group, only 5.3% of notices were 
sent by individuals directly.  
At the same time, automation has largely taken over the notice submission 
process.  In Urban’s 2016 study, 98.9% of the takedown requests in the sample were 
submitted using an automated Google notice submission form and almost entirely 
 
 30. Urban et al., supra note 21, at 8–9, 27, 150. 
 31. Scott Smitelli, Fun with YouTube’s Audio Content ID System, SCOTTSMITTELI.COM (Apr. 21, 
2010),  https://perma.cc/85FG-D6K8; s.  See also Perel and & Elkin-Koren, supra note 28; Kitchin, supra 
note 28.  
 32. Urban et al., supra note 21, at 9; Seng, supra note 5.  For a study on Chilling Effects repository 
(previously known as Lumen database), see Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or 
“Chilling Effects”? Takedown notices under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 (2006). 
 33. See Kristofer Erickson and Martin Kretschmer, “This Video is Unavailable”:  Analyzing 
Copyright Takedown of User-Generated Content on YouTube, 9 J. INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. & E-COM. 
L. 75 (2018). 
 34. Urban & Quilter, supra note 32, at 650. 
 35. Seng, supra note 5, at 393. 
 36. Urban & Quilter, supra note 32, at 654. 
 37. Urban et al., supra note 21, at 84. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Seng, supra note 5, at 396. 
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from Google’s partnership program (TCRP), which allows members to submit large 
volumes of requests.40  All the above aspects influence the fact that NTD is 
increasingly becoming a tool relying on automated processes carried out by repeat 
players who specialize in the enforcement process.  While automation is not yet used 
by everyone in the enforcement chain, manual claiming is becoming a tiny fraction 
of how the system operates.  YouTube, for instance, claims that 99.5% of music 
claims on YouTube are matched automatically by Content ID.41 
B. NOTICE AND STAYDOWN 
At the moment, Germany is closest to the notice and staydown model.  In this 
jurisdiction, hosting providers are obliged, upon receiving a notice, not only to take 
down the notified content, but also to prevent its further reappearance.  This is an 
outcome of application of the domestic doctrine of injunctions, including against 
non-infringing actors, known as “Störerhaftung.”42  
The filtering obligations started in Germany in 2004 with the Federal Supreme 
Court’s Internetversteigerung I. judgement.43  According to the decision, the hosting 
providers can qualify as so-called “disturbers” and thus be held accountable for 
injunctions, irrespective of their liability in tort.  Such accountability does not impose 
an obligation to review the content of entries prior to any notification because this 
would disturb the business model of the platform.  However, the platform operator 
must block any ‘clear infringements’ which are pointed out.  In addition, it must take 
proactive steps to prevent infringements of a “similar kind” from occurring again.  
The court explicitly suggested the use of filtering software for these purposes.  In the 
sequel to the case,44 the court ruled that a platform should implement filtering 
software that would flag objectively suspicious offers (e.g. due to their low price for 
a certain keyword), which could subsequently be reviewed manually by the 
employees.  It was observed that the limit of reasonableness would certainly be 
reached if there were no other keywords for the filter.  The platform operator, 
however, should block the offers only if they constitute instances of “clear 
infringement.”  These two auction platform cases imposed the first filtering 
obligations.  In the years to come, the main focus of the cases were these filtering 
 
 40. Urban et al., supra note 21, at 82. 
 41. Lyor Cohen, Five Observations from My Time at YouTube, YOUTUBE: OFFICIAL BLOG, 
(Aug. 17, 2017), https://perma.cc/RS5G-DG9T. 
 42. See generally Thomas Hoeren & Silviya Yankova, The Liability of Internet Intermediaries – 
The German Perspective, INT’L. REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 501, 501–31 (2012); Matthias 
Leistner, Störerhaftung und mittelbare Schutzrechtsverletzung GRUR-BEIL. 1 ff. (2010); Ansgar Ohly, 
Urheberrecht in der digitalen Welt - Brauchen wir neue Regelungen zum Urheberrecht und dessen 
Durchsetzung? F 112 (Gregor Bachmann ed.) VERHANDLUNGEN DES 70. DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGES 
(2014). 
 43. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 11, 2004, I ZR 304/01. 
 44. BGH Apr. 19, 2007, I ZR 35/04. 
HUSOVEC, THE PROMISES OF ALGORITHMIC COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 53 (2018) 
62 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [42:1 
obligations of platforms, such as auction platforms45 and file-sharing platforms,46 but 
also re-publishers of RSS feeds,47 blogging platforms,48 and domain name parking 
companies.49 
In a typical scenario, an intermediary receives a notification regarding a particular 
infringement.  It is obliged to take the content down if wrongful and take further 
reasonable efforts to prevent its reappearance.  However, this proactive staydown 
obligation is not limited to identical content from identical users (double identity), 
but extends also to infringements of “similar kind” of the same work/sign,50 even if 
infringing content reappears only in part,51 regardless of who posted it.52  One 
notification is thus enough to create this staydown obligation for a particular 
protected subject matter.53  The extent of “technically and commercially reasonable” 
measures to prevent reappearance depends on many factors, including the active role 
and nature of the posed risk by the platform.54 
The courts already ruled that some hosting providers may be required to (1) 
employ word-filtering technology for the name of the notified work, including on 
existing uploads;55 (2) use better than basic fingerprinting technology that only 
detects identical files, such as MD5,56 as a supplementary tool; (3) manually check 
external websites for the infringing links associated with the notified name of a work 
on services like Google, Facebook, and Twitter; or (4) use web-crawlers to detect 
other links on one’s own service.  According to the Court’s argument, this last 
proactive measure is more reasonable manually reviewing the files that were not 
caught by the word-filter.57  The obligation thus includes the use of automated 
staydown solutions, such as filters, and internal and external checks.  
In August 2016, the European Commission’s plans for the copyright reform 
leaked, including its proposal for the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single 
Market.58  The newly proposed rules plan to substantially revise existing 
 
 45. BGH Mar. 11, 2004, I ZR 304/01; BGH May 16, 2013, I ZR 216/11; BGH July 22, 2010, I ZR 
139/08. 
 46. BGH Aug. 15, 2013, I ZR 79/12; BGH Aug. 15, 2013, I ZR 80/12; BGH July 12, 2012, I ZR 
18/11. 
 47. BGH Mar. 27, 2012, VI ZR 144/11. 
 48. The operator of a blogging platform does not have to review the content a priori, but must only 
act upon notice.  The notice, however, must, without the need for detailed factual and legal checks, enable 
the platform provider to establish the wrongfulness of objected content.  If such notice is received, the 
provider must not only remove the objected content, but also take reasonable measures to prevent its 
reappearance.  See BGH Oct. 25, 2011, VI ZR 93/10, ¶¶ 22, 24, 26. 
 49. BGH Nov. 18, 2010, I ZR 155/09. 
 50. BGH Mar. 11, 2004, I ZR 304/01. 
 51. BGH Aug. 15, 2013, I ZR 79/12, ¶ 55. 
 52. Id., ¶ 45; BGH July 12, 2012, I ZR 18/11 (tenor). 
 53. BGH Aug. 15, 2013, I ZR 79/12, ¶ 58. 
 54. Id., ¶ 20; BGH Aug. 15, 2013, I ZR 80/12, ¶ 15; BGH May 16, 2013, I ZR 216/11, ¶ 48. 
 55. BGH July 12, 2012, I ZR 18/11. 
 56. BGH Aug. 15, 2013, I ZR 80/12, ¶ 58; BGH Aug. 15, 2013, I ZR 79/12, ¶ 46. 
 57. BGH July 12, 2012, I ZR 18/11, ¶ 39; BGH Aug. 15, 2013, I ZR 79/12, ¶ 53. 
 58. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the 
Digital Single Market, COM (2016) 593 final (Sept. 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/8KNK-WCSB 
[hereinafter Proposal on DSM Directive]. 
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intermediary liability rules for the copyright and related rights.  Article 13(1) of the 
Proposal essentially comes up with a mandatory notice and staydown regime for all 
the platforms that “store and provide to the public access to large amounts of works 
or other subject-matter uploaded by their users.”59  In August 2017, the Estonian 
Presidency of the EU proposed two compromise versions, both of which include 
staydown as the policy choice.60  Staydown should apply to every platform that 
“stores and provides access to the public to a significant amount of copyright 
protected works or other subject-matter uploaded by their users who do not hold the 
relevant rights in the content uploaded.”61  The final version of European Council’s 
proposal was adopted in May 2018.62  In June 2018, the Legal Affairs (JURI) 
Committee of the European Parliament voted in favor of another proposal drafted by 
Rapporteur MEP Axel Voss.63  As of the time of publication, the legislative process 
is still ongoing.  
The legislative proposals attempt to establish a new stand-alone obligation to 
prevent third party infringement, independent of exclusive rights.  It will be a 
copyright-related obligation, though any infringement can hardly be seen as 
copyright infringement.  The sanctioning of this obligation will be left to the Member 
States which means additional fragmentation through the transposition process.  As 
a consequence, the staydown obligation might be enforced by administrative fines in 
one country and private claims in the other.  In all these proposals, staydown policy 
functions as a market-entry obligation on “Information society service providers . . . 
to prevent the availability on their services of works or other subject-matter identified 
by rightholders[,]” including by content recognition technologies.64  All the 
 
 59. “Information society service providers that store and provide to the public access to large 
amounts of works or other subject-matter uploaded by their users shall, in cooperation with rightholders, 
take measures to ensure the functioning of agreements concluded with rightholders for the use of their 
works or other subject-matter or to prevent the availability on their services of works or other subject-
matter identified by rightholders through the cooperation with the service providers.  Those measures, 
such as the use of effective content recognition technologies, shall be appropriate and proportionate. The 
service providers shall provide rightholders with adequate information on the functioning and the 
deployment of the measures, as well as, when relevant, adequate reporting on the recognition and use of 
the works and other subject-matter.”  See Proposal on DSM Directive, supra note 58, art. 13; see also 
Martin Husovec, EC Proposes Stay-down and Expanded Obligation to Licenses UGC services, HUTKO’S 
TECHNOLOGY LAW BLOG (Sept. 1, 2016, 11:22 AM), https://perma.cc/VT7K-BM74. 
 60. Id.; Martin Husovec, Compromising (on) the Digital Single Market? A Quick Look at the 
Estonian Presidency Proposal(s) on Art. 13, KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (Sept. 8, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/J66H-KABH. 
 61. Proposal on DSM Directive, supra note 5858, art. 13. 
 62. Directive 2016/0280 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 2018 on 
Copyright in the Digital Single Market, https://perma.cc/GR26-5NE4. 
 63. For the discussion, see Christina Angelopoulos, Axel Voss’s JURI Report on Article 13 Would 
Violate Internet Users’ Fundamental Rights, KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (June 29, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/L5ZM-4DVE. 
 64. Proposal on DSM Directive, supra note 58, art. 13.  The European Council affirmed that the 
“collaboration between information society service providers storing and providing access to the public 
to large amounts of copyright protected works . . . is essential for the functioning of technologies, such as 
content recognition technologies.”  Proposal on DSM Directive, Recital 39; in turn, the European 
Commission defines market entry obligations as “those measures, such as the use of effective content 
recognition technologies[.]”  Id., art. 13 (emphasis added). 
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proposals seem to aim for German-style preventive measures that reduce 
infringements irrespective of who is committing the act of infringement, although 
this is not completely clear from the wording.  Moreover, the obligation would apply 
not only to copyrighted works, but also to neighboring rights, such as rights of 
broadcasters, performing artists, phonogram producers, and, potentially, 
publishers.65  This means that even copyright-related rights, such as neighboring 
rights, which often do not have to meet an objective standard of protection like 
originality will be protected in this way.  This will make the measures even more 
difficult to apply. 
II. ENFORCEMENT ECONOMICS 
American DMCA, European E-Commerce Directive, and Chinese Tort Law66 
incorporate similar forms of the statutory negligence standard 67, or negligence per 
se.68  Services such as hosting of third-party information, providing information 
location tools, or similar services69 are often subject to liability only upon obtaining 
knowledge either from notice, and/or other sources.  Under such a system, 
responsibilities are placed on both right holders and intermediaries.  The former 
should assist by identifying the infringing content and the latter by examining 
requests and taking the content down if necessary.  This two-stage two-person 
process can be well-explained by the negligence rule of so called joint-care scenarios.  
The rule of negligence aims at setting socially efficient (optimal) levels of care. 
Economic analysis uses the so-called Learned Hand formula as the basis of the model 
for optimal care.  All the intermediaries or right holders taking less than optimal 
care-levels (B < PL) are liable for the harm they cause.  The optimal level of care 
should not be higher than the harm (L) multiplied by the probability of such harm 
(P).  If damage is multilateral and both parties exercise optimal care-levels, the 
negligence rule allocates the residual loss where it falls.  In the context of 
 
 65. The Proposal does not include any definition of this term.  However, looking at the Directive, 
it is clear what some of those rights are in the copyright context.  Directive 2001/29 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and 
Related Rights in the Information Society, art. 3, §2, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter InfoSoc Directive]. 
 66. Supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 67. Landes and Lichtman discuss the negligence standard of DMCA safe harbors.  William M. 
Landes & Douglas Lichtman, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395, 405 (2003); Lemley describes the European approach as negligence based. Mark 
A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. LAW 101, 118 (2007).  
For discussion on safe harbors and fault-based liability, see Jonina S. Larusdottir, Liability of 
Intermediaries for Copyright Infringement in the Case of Hosting on the Internet, 47 STOCKHOLM INST. 
FOR SCANDINAVIAN LAW, 471, 476 (2004); Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet 
Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 250 (2005) (Mann and Belzley found that “the 
existing liability regimes . . .  are largely fault-based”). 
 68. ROBERT COOTER & ARIEL PORAT, GETTING INCENTIVES RIGHT:  IMPROVING TORTS, 
CONTRACTS, AND RESTITUTION 6 (Princeton Univ. Press ed., 2014). 
 69. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 14, 2013, VI ZR 269/12 (Ger.). 
(Google suggestion tool is liable only upon notice); Paula Vargas, Argentine Supreme Court Decides 
Landmark Intermediary Liability Case, STANFORD CIS BLOG (Nov. 5, 2014), https://perma.cc/WZ2G-
AFYM. 
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infringement of intellectual property rights on the Internet, it is the right holder who 
bears the residual loss.  The Learned Hand formula must always be applied in its 
marginal form by measuring the costs (B) and benefits of incremental improvements 
in safety (PL) to yield efficient results.70 If care taken is not optimal (B < PL), the 
negligent party will bear the resulting harm (L). 
A. NTD & NSD AS NEGLIGENCE STANDARDS 
Intermediaries process countless numbers of postings of their users.  Even small 
start-ups can usually take pride in impressive numbers, which no team of humans 
would ever be able to pre-moderate.  This automated processing of information 
makes computing a sweeping change for society and is at the heart of the digital 
revolution.  Some of this data, however, carries infringements of intellectual property 
rights, which take various forms.  Some of them are easy to establish without the 
assistance of right holders, others are more difficult or even impossible.  The need to 
identify the protected content in the sheer volume and the subsequent need to 
determine its status thus inflate the otherwise low burden on the intermediaries.71  
Intermediaries would be required not only to inspect their content, flag suspicious 
posts and then proceed to their evaluation, but also to pro-actively collect information 
about all existing protected objects.  Two basic costs are inevitably shaping the legal 
framework in this direction.  These are the costs of determining IP ownership, 
including costs of legality of use, and costs of understanding right holder’s licensing 
arrangements. 
First, there are literally millions of potential rights holders with a vast number of 
protected objects that can be misused online.  For copyrighted works, intermediaries 
lack comprehensive reference databases, even if they were to completely take over 
all the enforcement efforts.  This private information of right holders about 
ownership of rights constitutes a cost for intermediaries.  It makes an action in the 
pre-notification phase an impossible task.  It is also the reason why the NSD model 
still relies on the first-notification by the right holders.  Such notification reduces or 
eliminates the cost of determining the IP rights.  Moreover, it is no secret that quality 
of meta-data in the music industry is a persistent problem that prevents many 
efficiencies from taking place.72 
Second, in the pre-notification phase, an intermediary has no means of knowing 
whether the content that is technically an infringement is not licensed to a third party 
for such a use, put online directly by the right holder, with his simple consent, or just 
purposefully tolerated or even encouraged by the right holder for business reasons.  
The intermediary would thus need to collect private information about ownership, 
 
 70. If the formula is 10 < 100, it is still possible that 11 < 20 and that 12 > 5, as the relationship 
does not have to be linear.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 168 (Aspen Publishers, 
6th ed. 2003). 
 71. Landes and Litchman note that it is “prohibitively expensive to distinguish legal from illegal 
copyright activity.”  Landes & Lichtman, supra note 67, at 404–05. 
 72. Niclas Molinder, Why Building More Rights Databases Won’t Solve the Music Industry 
Metadata Problem, HYPEBOT (Jan. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/3WC7-EVN9. 
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and concerning the entire licensing strategy and map of licensing arrangements of all 
the right holders in the world.  In the staydown model, the first notification is meant 
to communicate the default position of the right holder, which is to block the content, 
irrespective of the user or use.73 
As a consequence of the above circumstances, before notification, the costs of 
intervening to remove the content are generally higher than the expected harm (B > 
PL), so no obligation to intervene would usually arise.74  Unless the current form of 
defining, granting, and managing copyright were somehow simplified and publicly 
recorded, a large proportion of this information will not be readily available at zero 
cost.  Pre-notification costs would thus, for most types of infringements, remain 
prohibitive.75 
Right holders are in a better position to identify various types of infringements.  
In multilateral care scenarios, a certain level of care is expected from both parties 
under the negligence rule.  Right holders fulfill their part by assisting in the 
identification and determination of illegal content.76  In fact, when it comes to 
establishing ownership and its status, right holders can act more cheaply, since they 
have best knowledge of what is protected, who licensed the content from them or if 
they themselves acted as users, whether certain uses lead to any harm on their side, 
or whether they wish to tolerate user generated content for business reasons even if 
it is technically infringing.77  In other words, right holders know best what they own, 
what harms them, and who has their permission.  Such knowledge cannot simply be 
assumed in any cost benefit analysis. 
Submission of notices by right holders exponentially reduces the burden of 
intermediaries (B) and thus their obligation to intervene is triggered (B < PL).78  They 
are now supplied with more private information as well as the location of the 
infringing files.  If the law allows, intermediaries can also clear doubts about the 
content with their users.  This assumes, however, that the legal framework does not 
discourage such a dialogue.  Systems of counter-notices that encourage users to 
oppose erroneously notified content actually assist right holders in reducing the 
margin of error of their submissions.79 
Although costs of establishing IP ownership and licensing legitimatize some form 
of notification, such costs cannot immediately justify endorsement of notice and 
 
 73. One can imagine, however, that more granular staydown notification regarding the context 
would be possible as well. 
 74. Matthew Schruers, The History and Economics of ISP Liability for Third Party Content, 88 
VA. L. REV. 205, 234 (2002).  
 75. Lemley views the assessment on illegality ex ante, or before notice, as difficult, if not 
impossible.  Lemley, supra note 67, at 111; see also id. at 236. 
 76. Not exercising this diligence on their side could then lead to comparative negligence. 
 77. For instance, FreemantleMedia, the production group behind the X-Factor and Britain’s Got 
Talent, tolerates infringement by users who use clips uploaded by them to drive audience interest in its 
program.  See Gabriela Vatu, YouTube Handed Out $1 Billion in Ad Money Thanks to Content ID, 
Softpedia (Oct. 14, 2014, 9:39 AM), https://perma.cc/ST45-A4HD.  
 78. Schruers, supra note 74, at 234. 
 79. Accordingly, notification could become a tool against misalignment of incentives of ISPs and 
users. Urban and Quilter also speak in favor of take-down after notice and right to reply have been 
initiated. Urban & Quilter, supra note 32, at 689. 
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takedown.  To the contrary, notice and staydown also seems to acknowledge that 
right holders are best placed to identify their protected content.  NSD and NTD differ 
in how the post-notification enforcement should be structured.  Both policies seem 
to recognize that optimal enforcement is not possible without right holders doing 
their part.  The interest of one right holder does not always match the interests of 
others.  Consider fan fiction sites or video game streaming platforms, each of which. 
may technically qualify for an infringement of copyright.  Some right holders might 
oppose them, but others even encourage them.  It depends on the business models or 
strategies of particular right holders.  One uniform enforcement imposed by a 
platform such as pre-filtering of all content, if even possible, might not be beneficial 
to all the right holders.  The first-notification system allows right holders to supply 
necessary information and signal their own preferences.  Therefore, the main 
disagreement between NTD and NSD seems to lie elsewhere, namely in how post-
notification enforcement should look.  
B. A-TYPES AND NYA-TYPES 
Staydown obligates intermediaries to prevent infringements that are identical or 
similar to previous ones, assuming that the first notification always makes it easier 
to automatically identify and determine the subsequent infringement.  However, only 
infringements that can be automated have this property.  The only advantage the 
repeated submissions have for all other infringements is that they help to establish a 
reference database for objects that might be infringed upon (if accompanied with 
finger-print data) and indicate the right holders’ preferences to enforce.  But the sole 
fact that something is repeated can change little about the possibility of automating 
the evaluation process.  The capabilities of automation are dependent on the state of 
technological development, such as of artificial intelligence.  Only if technologies 
are accurate in their evaluation with only a negligible rate of false positives similar 
to those associated with expert human judgment, can we speak of automatable types 
of infringements (A-Types).  Once infringements become A-Types, use of 
automation is hardly objectionable as its social costs are not higher than under 
human-implemented NTD.  On the other hand, when automation is forced upon any 
other, not-yet-automatable infringements (NYA-Types), the social cost of 
enforcement is higher because the technology creates a unique over-blocking harm 
by its non-negligible rate of false positives. 
In the social sciences, there is mounting literature showing that in the battle of 
human vs. algorithm, human can lose.80  Daniel Kahneman points out that even if 
great uncertainty is characteristic of the domain, algorithms can outperform 
humans.81  Such areas include prediction of the longevity of cancer patients, the 
length of hospital stays, the diagnosis of cardiac disease, the susceptibility of babies 
 
 80. Meehl claimed that data-driven algorithms can better predict human behavior than trained 
clinical psychologists.  See PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION:  A 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 60 (Leslie J. Yonce ed., 1st ed. 1954).  See 
also DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 223, 465 (Farrar, Straus, & Grioux, 2011). 
 81. Kahneman, supra note 8080, at 223. 
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to sudden infant death syndrome, the evaluation of credit risks by banks, the future 
career satisfaction of workers, the assessments of the suitability of foster parents, the 
odds of recidivism among juvenile offenders, the likelihood of violent behavior, the 
evaluation of scientific presentations, the winners of football games, and the future 
prices of Bordeaux wine.  There is no reason why we should think that detection of 
IP infringements should be less susceptible to automation.  Moreover, unless 
algorithms are not better than trained human experts, automation could still help as 
an aid to human judgment (semi-automation). 
In the copyright literature, the question of automation of the fair-use assessment 
(or fair use by design) is increasingly receiving attention.  Elkin-Koren argues that 
we should embrace fair use by design and encourage that it becomes coded into 
technological solutions.82  Others are of the view that algorithms are not yet or will 
be never be in a position to adjudicate such delicate questions.83  It is possible that 
high-quality automation that achieves negligible margin of error will remain 
workable only with respect to some instances of infringements, protected subject 
matter or parts of the evaluation process.  Evaluation of some elements might remain 
too contextual to ever be fully automated.84  In any case, for the purposes of this 
article, it is not pressing to know what the actual ratio of A-Types and NYA-Types 
is or will be in the future.  It is more important to recognize the existence of the two 
categories as they affect the socio-economic analysis.  The question of whether AI 
significantly pushes the ratio towards A-Types and thus completely erases contextual 
concerns is important, but analytically less crucial, as this Article will try to show. 
The often-repeated argument in favor of staydown is that it better solves a so 
called “whack-a-mole” problem of the online enforcement.  It is suggested that 
notification of the online content is akin to a game in an amusement arcade in which 
players use a mallet to hit toy moles, which appear at random, and them go back into 
their holes.85  This analogy compares online enforcement via notice and takedown to 
a situation in which attempts to solve a problem are piecemeal or superficial, 
resulting only in temporary or minor improvement.86  Moreover, the argument is that 
if the intermediaries are obliged to prevent the publication of the third party 
infringing content, the harm would be prevented before it can be caused by going 
online. 
However, it is questionable if the “whack-a-mole” metaphor captures the main 
challenges in the dynamic of today´s online enforcement.  According to some 
empirical research, it seems that the most significant problem is that NTD, under the 
 
 82. Elkin-Koren, supra note 5, at 1085.  
 83. Lemley, supra note 67, 110-11; Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for 
Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 56 (2001); Edward W. Felten, A Skeptical View 
of DRM and Fair Use, COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at 57–58. 
 84. Some patent offices are trying to push the boundaries of automation by employing artificial 
intelligence already in the patent registration process:  AIbusiness, The Japan Patent Office Deploying AI 
to Screen Patent Application, AI BUS., https://perma.cc/B5VE-85XA (last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
 85. See Whack-a-mole, Oxford Living Dictionaries, https://perma.cc/4SUB-LSME (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2017). 
 86. Id. 
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existing resource restraints,87 cannot be sufficiently scaled up to target all or even 
most of the content.  The notice and take-down seems to work generally well for 
what is notified, by making the notified content short-lived.  However, the problem 
is the content which is never notified and goes unnoticed.88  Its life expectancy is 
surprisingly long and usually terminated by the services themselves and not right 
holders.89  If this observation applies in general to the infringing ecosystem, then the 
online enforcement has rather a problem of scale.  It would suggest that if all the 
content could be spotted by right holders and notified quickly enough, NTD would 
assure its fast removal and thus avoid most of the harm.  The scalability of 
enforcement is intertwined with automation. There can be only as much scalability 
as technology and resources allow.90  Human review can never cope with the volume 
of internet content.  
Applications such as YouTube, eBay, DropBox, Facebook, cyberlockers, 
advertisement providers, search engines, and web forums are involved in 
intermediating content, whether it is actual files, web-streams, hyper-links, or other 
references such as search results or magnet links.  Where automation is possible after 
the first notification, the costs of re-detection of the content are lowered not only for 
the notified piece of content, but also for all its A-Types.  This could be an argument 
in favor of continuous obligation to prevent re-appearance of the content whose 
detection can be automated (B < PL), while keeping social costs constant.  As long 
as costs of using automation per notice (B) is lower than the notified expected harm 
(PL), the obligation to filter such content is triggered.  Since I defined A-Types as 
those which are subject to high-quality automation with negligible rate of false 
positives, the social cost (SC) is not worsened compared to NTD.  It could be even 
improved relative to NTD (SCNSD  ≤ SCNTD) because automation can be also superior 
to human judgment.  One of the great promises of automation is that it can actually 
outperform expert human judgment.  
For NYA-Types, the cost of intervention after first notification remains high, 
though lowered with now available information about right holder’s rights and their 
enforcement preferences.  Since I defined NYA-Types as assessments which cannot 
be automated without negligible amount of error, their proper assessment requires 
 
 87. Lauinger and his colleagues reported that for most of the file hosting platforms studied, more 
than half of the links survive for at least 30 days, even though they are all infringing; on the other hand, 
up to 40% of the content is blocked within five days.  See Tobias Lauinger et al., Clickonomics: 
Determining the Effect of Anti-Piracy Measures for One-Click Hosting, NDSS SYMPOSIUM 1–14 (2013), 
https://perma.cc/4A8P-GYLV. 
 88. For criticism of the system broadly, see Jennifer L. Pariser, Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Reply 
Comments Submitted in Response to Request for Comments on U.S. Copyright Office Section 512 Study 
at 3–5 (Apr. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/RE9N-83MZ; Jeffrey Harleston et al., Universal Music Grp., Reply 
Comments Submitted in Response to Section 512 Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment at 3–9 
(Apr. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/ZQS7-LFE7. 
 89. Lauinger, supra note 87, at 8.  
 90. Lack of resources is cited as one of the key problems for independent artists.  See The American 
Association of Independent Music (“A2IM”) and the Future of Music Coalition (“FMC”), Reply 
Comments Submitted in Response to Request for Comments on U.S. Copyright Office Section 512 Study 
(Apr. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/94ZU-EWJ7 (“65% of [respondents] that did not actively search for 
unauthorized use attributed the reason to not having enough resources to search for infringing activity.”). 
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either co-use or full use of (manual) human judgment, which is costly.  As long as 
this is costlier than expected harm (B > PL), a right holder can have a comparative 
advantage in carrying out such human judgment more cheaply.  It seems therefore 
more effective to let the intermediary wait for a next unique notification.  If 
automation is forced upon NYA-Types, the social cost (SC) is worsened compared 
to NTD (SCNSD > SCNTD) because of the additional errors of over-blocking caused by 
automation.  
C. AUTOMATION OF ENFORCEMENT 
At the time when notice and takedown policy was conceived, it was anticipated 
that the system would be used by humans or firms who individually search for 
content, evaluate it, notify it, evaluate it again, and then make a decision about its 
availability.  However, this description does not correspond to the existing practice 
anymore.  Many of the steps, as explained earlier, are increasingly automated and the 
so called “algorithmic enforcement” is emerging from it.91  This has important 
consequences for cost and benefit analysis as well.  Before the use of algorithms, it 
was assumed that all information and transactions would need to be carried out 
manually at high costs.  Now many of these decisions can be automated.  If we think 
about the potential use of automation of enforcement, the following basic picture 
emerges: 
 
Scenarios (1)–(4) are usually expected under NTD model.  Right holders and 
intermediaries are given the flexibility to choose between automation and manual 
claiming under NTD; they can also rely on their mix (semi-automation).  From the 
societal point of view, we want the parties to choose algorithms for A-Types, human 
review for NYA-Types, right holders for generating notices, and intermediaries for 
their review.  If there are, however, no corresponding incentives, right holders, in 
particular, will rely on automation everywhere, since it is cheaper to use and they do 
not face the externalities of over-notification.  Similarly, if intermediaries are not 
 
 91. See Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 
19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473 (2016).  See also Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 28.  
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sanctioned by public opinion,92 exit of users, the costs of processing counter-claims 
of its users or otherwise, they will use automation whenever it is cheaper and makes 
commercial sense for them.  In other words, both sides today have strong incentives 
to use automation, but not necessarily high-quality ones. 
Situation 4—coordinated automated enforcement—is a form of bilateral filtering 
and is also already taking place.  Google uses the Trusted Copyright Removal 
Program (TCRP), which, in 2012, accounted for 91.50% of all take-downs 
received.93  Right holders submitting notices often hire enforcement agents that use 
fingerprinting technologies to spot infringements.  And Google also uses secret tools 
of automation to evaluate the take-downs.  Similarly, in a peer-to-peer context, many 
right holders work together with universities and take advantage of the ACNS 
standard submission system.94  Right holders again hire firms which use 
fingerprinting technologies to generate such notices.  Universities can also use 
automation to respond to them, but they do not have to.  In other words, mutually 
beneficial automation occurs even today.  Such automation not only exponentially 
increases the scale for infringement detection and thus reduces the life expectancy of 
more infringing content, but also extends the market for new technologies.95  As long 
as bilateral filtering is used for A-Types, it is not only mutually, but also socially 
optimal.  When it is used for NYA-Types, it can be beneficial mutually, but is sub-
optimal socially. 
Even under NTD, intermediaries sometimes assume both tasks:  detection & 
review.  This scenario takes place in a form of a voluntary action under NTD, such 
as YouTube’s Content ID (it is Scenario 6, however, with a reference-file 
requirement).  As seen in the diagram above, such arrangement collapses a two stage 
two-player process into the sole post-notification responsibility of an intermediary.  
Interestingly enough, even the converse scenario when right holders assume both 
tasks does happen under NTD policy (Scenario 5).  An example is a case where an 
intermediary provides a direct API-interface to right holders to identify and delete 
infringing content.  Scenario 5 occurs sometimes as a voluntary action under NTD.  
In such a case, right holders can detect and act on their own on the service, however 
often they are contractually or technically restricted.  Often, this interface is coupled 
with some automation, or allows third-party automation to be plugged-in.  Thus 
Scenarios 5 & 6 usually come hand in hand with some form of automation. 
If algorithmic enforcement or filtering means automation of enforcement, it 
occurs not only in the last two scenarios of unilateral filtering (Scenarios 5 & 6), but 
also in bilateral filtering scenario (Scenario 4), where algorithmically generated 
notices sent by right holders are processed by algorithms of intermediaries.  Such 
filtering is basically a battle of two or more algorithms.  Emergence of bilateral 
filtering is important because it means that enforcement automation is not an 
 
 92. See e.g., Parker Higgins et al., Who Has Your Back? Protecting Your Speech from Copyright 
and Trademark Bullies, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 27, 2014) https://perma.cc/9PZC-9LHB 
 93. Seng, supra note 5, at 437. 
 94. See ACSN, Automated Copyright Notice System 2.0 (2015), https://perma.cc/3NNK-SPQX 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
 95. Seng, supra note 5, at 414, 451 (increasing scale), 417 (intensifying competition). 
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exclusive feature of the NSD model.  Automated enforcement thus can take 
advantage of both “policy homes” and can be carried out:  (1) by right holders and 
intermediaries together; (2) by right holders alone; or (3) by intermediaries alone.  
While NTD captures all three options, filtering by intermediaries only is the required 
norm under NSD. 
Under notice and staydown (NSD), where unilateral filtering by intermediaries 
becomes compulsory, intermediaries wishing to avoid its implementation would 
need to obtain consent from all the notifying and potentially notifying right holders.  
It is clear that obtaining such consent is practically impossible, as transaction costs 
would be prohibitively high.  This means the use of automation would remain the 
rule and cannot be realistically opted-out from.  This contrasts with notice and 
takedown (NTD) model, under which bilateral filtering (Scenario 4) can be 
implemented without any coordination.  The two other forms of unilateral filtering—
by intermediaries only (Scenarios 6) and by right holders only (Scenario 5) —require 
coordination under NTD. 
Moreover, at the point when such a bilateral filtering solution starts clearly 
duplicating the efforts on the detection and evaluation side, e.g. because both parties 
use the same technology, it is enough that only a handful of right holders or 
intermediaries are interested in negotiating a change.  So, for instance, a small group 
of right holders can negotiate that some portion of the automation is implemented 
solely by some intermediaries.  For instance, if a right holder and a photo-sharing 
platform use the same scanning technology and referential database for identifying 
infringements, they can negotiate about its use by just one of them.  Unlike in other 
situations, the freeloader problem, i.e. that the enforcement measure burdens only 
some, but generates equal benefit to all, is not an issue here because enforcement 
measures can exclude non-participating right holders from obtaining benefits.96  This 
means that whereas it takes all the right holders for an intermediary to be able to opt-
out from an (obligatory) standard of unilateral filtering (i.e. NSD), it takes only a few 
right holders to opt-in to the same system which is not obligatory.  The reason for 
this is the asymmetric transaction costs.  
NSD essentially ignores the technological divide between A-Types and NYA-
Types and simply accepts the associated social costs of the over-blocking of content 
for which technologies are not up to the task.  Unlike NTD, which allows to 
progressively use automation where it is apt, NSD produces a unique social cost of 
over-enforcement by algorithmic tools.  The intermediaries under NSD do not have 
an option to use automation where the risk of false positives is only negligible, and 
have to use it even for infringements where such risk is high.  How large such a social 
cost is depends on the state of scanning technologies and their precision for a type of 
protected subject matter.  At the moment, the scanning technologies have made 
substantial progress in the area of audio-visual and musical works thanks to 
 
 96. For discussion on problem of freeloaders, see GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 
(Yale Univ. Press 1970).  For a specified freeloaders’ problem in the context of bargaining after an 
injunction was granted, see Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem:  Some 
Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. & ECON. 73, 96–97 (1982).  
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fingerprinting technologies, but the situation can be completely different for 
algorithmic enforcement of other works or protected subject matter.97 
D. MARKET FOR FILTERING 
One of the arguments put forward in favor of notice and staydown is that it will 
stimulate the market with content recognition technologies.  It is argued that, at the 
moment, the technologies are not cheap and thus not widely available for the right 
holders.98  There are no comprehensive studies of the filtering technologies market.99  
The European Commission, when proposing Art. 13, did not include any market 
analysis in its Impact Assessment.100  
If we take one of the go-to firms, Audible Magic, in its public price list we can 
see that prices differ depending on the number of transactions.  Scanning of 5,000 
uploaded files per month can cost around $1,500, while 25,000 files around $4,500 
in licensing, excluding the costs of the set-up and maintenance on the side of an 
intermediary.  Urban and others reported that medium-sized companies engaged in 
file-hosting services included in their survey paid between $10,000 and $25,000 a 
month in fees for Audible Magic’s filtering tool alone.101  Many large platforms 
develop their own content recognition technologies when they reach certain scale.  
This is certainly the case of Google and Facebook. 
Google developed its ContentID system at an alleged cost of more than $60 
million.102  But this system has already distributed $1 billion to artists, which, under 
the publicized 55:45 revenue split,103 would mean almost $820 million for Google.  
 
 97. Evan Engstrom & Nick Feamster, The Limits of Filtering:  A Look at the Functionality & 
Shortcomings of Content Detection Tools, ENGINE (Mar. 28, 2017),  https://perma.cc/4JW5-S5N2. 
 98. “Many smaller copyright owners . . . lack access to third-party services and sophisticated tools 
to monitor for infringing uses, which can be costly, and must instead rely on manual search and 
notification processes.”  U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 1, at 3. 
 99. In November 2015, the European Commission contracted a study entitled:  Economic analysis 
of the impact of some online intermediaries on the distribution of copyright protected content. In terms of 
reference to SMART 2015/0080, it stated:  “The main purpose of the study is to collect data on the role 
and impact of such online intermediaries on the online distribution of copyright protected content and the 
sharing of the value created with right holders.  The study should also assess the impact of possible 
measures that could be taken at EU level to clarify the rules applicable to online intermediaries when 
distributing copyright protected content.”  Although the study was already completed by ECORYS, its 
results were not yet published.  See ECORYS, Small and Medium Enterprises, https://perma.cc/6AUQ-
B9Y3 (last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
 100. Commission Staff Working Document – EC, Impact Assessment on the Modernization of EU 
Copyright Rules: Part 1, COM(2016) 593, https://perma.cc/Q67Z-R72M. 
 101. Urban et al, supra note 21, at 64. 
 102. See Section 512 of Title 17:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intell. Prop. & the 
Internet, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Katherine Oyama, Sr. Copyright Policy Counsel, Google Inc.), 
https://perma.cc/KY2N-Z8FX. 
 103. Todd Spangler, Despite YouTube’s Emmy, Google Still Has a Long Way to Go, VARIETY (Oct. 
24, 2013), https://perma.cc/RRY5-7HLC (last visited Nov. 19, 2014); Danielle Duarte, Video 
Monetization, YouTube, and Multi-Channel Networks 101, DLREPORTER (Apr. 3, 2014) 
https://perma.cc/RE9E-JH8D (accessed by searching Wayback Machine for the now-defunct web 
address); JWFocus, The Future of Online Video: Multi-Channel Video Strategy, JW FOCUS: ENTM’T (Mar. 
1, 2014), https://perma.cc/SE2C-2ZS6; Paul Tassi, The Injustice Of The YouTube Content ID Crackdown 
Reveals Google’s Dark Side, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2013), 
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In other words, it is not surprising that Google would not want to license the tool to 
competitors, since it is its ‘money machine’ and provides a competitive edge over 
those who use the widely used proprietary systems from Audible Magic or other 
companies.104  Soundcloud said to have paid 5 million EUR for such technologies.105  
Facebook recently announced to develop its own tool as well.106  Such content 
recognition tools then become heart of the user-service interaction and often also the 
business model of the platform. 
As explained above, content recognition technologies are today used for two 
purposes:  to preemptively detect infringements by right holders (Scenarios 3, 4, 5) 
and by intermediaries (Scenario 6) and to automatically review the notifications 
received by right holders (Scenarios 2 and 4).  This means that sometimes the same 
content recognition technologies can meet on the submission and review stages, even 
without knowing or coordinating.  Under NTD, market for technologies is on both 
sides, among right holders and intermediaries who may want to use the technology 
to save the costs.  Under NSD, market is predominantly on the side of intermediaries 
who have to use the technology to be able to enter the market and operate there. 
The right holders claim that content recognition technologies currently are not 
cheap enough in order to be sufficiently inclusive also for smaller right holders.  This 
is hard to verify as the data is not publicly available.  This could suggest that the 
market is not competitive enough or that technologies are still not fully fit for the 
task.  It could also suggest that industry, for its part, is not able to resolve its meta-
data quality problem, which is a precondition of successful automation of 
enforcement.  Collecting and verifying meta-data constitutes large transactions costs, 
so their lack could easily impede use of such tools.  But let’s accept, for the sake of 
argument, that existing technologies are inaccessible.  Why could this be happening? 
First, one of the inefficiencies of the current NTD system seems to be that it poses 
obstacles to scalability of high-quality automation.  Different countries use different 
notice and takedown processes with divergent notice requirements.  Some countries 
might even outlaw the analysis of the platform content for the purposes detection of 
infringements.107  This fragments the market and prevents firms from employing 
cross-platform and cross-country notification.  Standardization could facilitate 
detection of infringements as well as cross-platform submission of notices.  Such 
welfare-maximizing effect of standardization is broadly observed in the literature in 
 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2013/12/19/the-injustice-of-the-youtube-content-id-crackdown-
reveals-googles-dark-side/. 
 104. Audible has several competitors, such as Digimarc (publishing industry), Gracenote, Pex and 
DetNec, now owned by Mark Monitor.  These and different technologies are then used by many agents 
(content management companies/scanning vendors) offering administration of online infringements.  For 
the list of the most widely used companies, see Seng, supra note 5, at 396. 
 105. Soundcloud has estimated in its reply to the public consultation on online platforms that it has 
spent approximately 5 million EUR on such technologies.  See 
http://www.cdep.ro/afaceri_europene/CE/2016/SWD_2016_301_EN_DOCUMENTDETRAVAIL2_f.d
ocx.  
 106. Josh Constine, Facebook Launches Video Rights Manager to Combat Freebooting, 
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 12, 2016), https://perma.cc/PS6V-CDDC. 
 107. There might be intellectual property as well as data protection issues that would require 
solution. 
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other areas.  Broadly-adopted standards can produce efficiency-enhancing network 
effects and other benefits.108  Swan identifies the following main benefits of 
standardization:  (1) providing for inter-operability or compatibility; (2) the provision 
of a minimum level of quality; (3) the reduction of variety, allowing for economies 
of scale and (4) the provision of information.109 
Even with standardization, however, one problem could remain.  Since any 
automation of enforcement requires reference files, and their multiplied copying in 
the process, any tool inadvertently engages in copyright relevant acts.  Moreover, 
such licensing requires clearing not only the targeted content of clients, but any 
copyrighted content that is being analyzed.  Clearing rights for such tools can be then 
very expensive or even impossible if it cannot benefit from an exception.110  Under 
NTD, right holders are unlikely to be interested in target technologies that help to 
detect infringing content.  They can obtain such clearance of rights in exchange for 
cheaper rates (if necessary).  Under NSD, however, right holders are no longer 
clients, and their activity might be subject to licensing arrangements that can make 
the entry to the market of filtering technologies again costlier and more difficult.  To 
address this, the development of filtering technologies engaging in data-mining 
processes could be incentivized by means of an exception.111 
Second, the unavailability of filtering technologies for some right holders might 
be also only the consequence of the current state of technological development.  It 
might be that some category of right holders cannot automate their enforcement 
efforts in general or for certain services because no appropriate technology exists as 
of yet.  In such a case, however, imposing an obligation to implement such (non-
existing) technology by means of NSD as a market-entry requirement just acts as 
strict liability rule.  The solution that is needed then is one of better incentives for 
new filtering technologies that can automatize previously NYA-Types.  NSD, 
however, provides very ambiguous incentives in this regard.  As this Article 
demonstrates, incentives are worse than under NTD. 
On one hand, one can argue that since automation is now a market-entry condition 
imposed on all the firms, there will be many more firms investing in the technology 
then before when it was only optional. In other words, the supply will improve thanks 
to higher demand.  However, there are two important limitations that put such effect 
in doubt, namely:  (1) the number of firms operating on the newly conditioned market 
is likely to decrease; and (2) an entire class of demand—one coming from right 
holders—is very likely to marginalize.  Since fewer firms can afford technologies, 
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Lerner, & Scott Stern, eds., 2001); Mark L. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 
85 TEX. L. REV 1991 (2007). 
 109. See G. M. Peter Swann, The Economics of Standardization, Final Report for Standards and 
Technical Regulations Directorate (London: Department of Trade and Industry, 2000). 
 110. In the United States, the tools are likely to benefit from a fair use exemption.  This is less likely 
in the EU at the moment. 
 111. Proposal on DSM Directive, supra note 58, Article 3(1). 
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fewer will want to enter regulated market and rather seek other product and 
geographical markets where no such barriers exist.  Moreover, since right holders on 
the regulated market are no longer interested in the filtering technologies, as 
intermediaries do the filtering for them, they have no incentives to continue to be the 
customers. 
This means that the demand for technologies is actually likely to shrink under 
NSD compared to NTD, where both intermediaries and right holders are interested 
in the services.  In addition, there is an additional dynamic that might question 
existence of cheap licensing of filtering for intermediaries.  Bigger intermediaries are 
very likely to develop such expensive mechanisms internally and then keep them in-
house as a competitive advantage.  This is understandable as filtering becomes a 
means of competition and a tool how to drive competitors out of market.  Under 
NTD, the incentives to develop technology are more aligned.  Right holder 
associations, such as INTA for trademarks or collecting societies for copyright, can 
aggregate resources for common technological solutions that could be used by all 
their members or even public (e.g. via open-sourcing them).  This is because the 
interests to prevent infringements are shared among the right holders. 
All this suggests that, in fact, filtering technologies are more likely to become 
easily accessible and cheaper when the primary customers remain numerous right 
holders and some intermediaries under NTD.  Even assuming away negative changes 
in the demand for technology, it is therefore more realistic to expect the development 
of cheap and widely available crowd-sourced filtering solutions to come from 
cooperation between right holders (who are mostly united in the interest of reduction 
of infringements) rather than from any cooperation among intermediaries, for whom 
such solutions are a source of competitive advantage.  To create a proper market, 
however, standardization is of essence.  Such standardization may be used by the 
governments to target innovation in a particular direction and can demand some 
fundamental transparency.112  
III. SWITCHING FROM NTD TO NSD 
The promise of NSD is that it will deliver a cost-effective solution to prevent the 
re-appearance of the future content.  This part compares the associated cost and 
benefits. 
A. COSTS AND BENEFITS 
The unilateral filtering obligations, whether pushed by a court or legislator, have 
advantages and disadvantages.  They produce different sets of costs and benefits.  
When comparing NTD and NSD, one should, among other things, take into account 
the extent to which NSD addresses the problems posed by NTD and whether they 
could not be addressed without inflicting other types of harm.  When we look at costs 
under Scenarios (1)-(4) and staydown policy option, we can observe the following: 
 
 112. See Section 2.B, supra.  
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Costs NTD NSD 
Right holders (i) Screening 
(ii) Notification 
(i) - 
(ii) First notification 
Intermediaries (i) - 
(ii) Evaluation 
(iii) Action 
(i) Screening 
(ii) Evaluation 
(iii) Action 
 
This means that the switch from NTD to NSD policy shifts the costs of screening 
onto intermediaries.  As discussed above, as long as this concerns A-Types, this is 
an efficient transfer of responsibilities.  If it concerns NYA-Types, it creates 
additional costs because right holders would be the cheaper cost-avoiders for the 
purposes of detection.  If the policy does not distinguish between the two, the right 
holders are relieved of any costs, with the exception of production of the first-notice 
for a particular service and sending the reference files.  As explained in Part 1.A 
supra, NTD itself is not certainly innocent of collateral social costs.  In particular, 
the costs of over-notification, over-compliance and under-assertion of rights were 
repeatedly documented and discussed in the literature.113  By prescribing automation 
in all cases, NSD, however, creates a novel set of social costs, which I refer to as 
over-use of automation.  
The overall consequence of staydown policy is abstract transfer of the screening 
costs from right holders to intermediaries.  This is a cross-subsidy of enforcement.  
However, one of the consequences of such transfer is the multiplication of the 
compliance costs.  While notice and takedown allows intermediaries to adjust their 
mechanisms to the overall notification-workload, the staydown policy requires them 
to implement costly automated enforcement even if one right holder issues his or her 
first-notice.  Irrespective of the number of right holders wishing filtering, they have 
to scan all the content.  In other words, even an interest of a single right holder will 
lead to an obligation to introduce a set of automated tools for all the content, 
regardless of the private benefit derived for participating right holders.  This means 
that, at least on the platform-level, use of automation can be sometimes clear waste 
of resources as the investment is not proportionate to the benefit derived. 
Last but not least, NSD is likely to cause increased concentration of the regulated 
market due to higher entry conditions of filtering.  This means not only foregone 
competition in those markets, but also limited follow-on innovation in the area.  If a 
country remains a lonely actor in the area, other countries will gain a corresponding 
comparative advantage in attracting start-ups as no licensing of filtering means easier 
experimentation on the market.  This does not mean that established firms will be 
unlikely to enter such regulated markets, but rather they will not be the source of new 
untested services.  Great attention should be paid to the licensing of reference files 
which are precondition of the functioning of staydown.  If right holders start 
 
 113. See Lenka Fiala & Martin Husovec, Using Experimental Evidence to Design Optimal Notice 
and Takedown Process (TILEC, Working Paper 2018), https://perma.cc/CY3K-CSYU (providing a 
summary of the literature). 
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exploiting such licensing as a vehicle for additional royalties, or conditions, the user-
generated content ceases to be the area of permission-less decentralized innovation.  
Such licensing would provide a ‘choke-point’ which regular licensing of content 
provides to labels against the streaming services. 
On the other hand, given that under Scenario 6, no two-stage process needs to take 
place, the screening occurs usually already on the upload-level.  This means that 
infringing information is not made available and thus no corresponding cost is 
inflicted upon a right holder.  This benefit of ex ante blocking—avoided loss of the 
pre-notification period—then constitutes one of the main arguments in favor of the 
immediate default staydown.  If we take Lauinger and other’s study114 as a rough 
benchmark for potential effects on some parts of the ecosystem, this could mean 
saving up those few days of availability of infringing content before the notice is 
produced.  However, the effect of pre-blocking is limited by detection capabilities of 
the filtering technologies, which also do not find all the content.  And most 
importantly, it is limited by the fact that many bad players will simply continue to 
serve the black market from abroad.  As the research in the area of website-blocking 
shows, the substitution between different methods of obtaining illegal content should 
not be underestimated.115 
One additional benefit would be extra detection from new staydown 
implementers.  The theory is that since under NTD firms implement NSD only 
voluntarily, under NSD, every firm will have to implement it.  Staydown 
implementation will improve detection beyond previous notifications and this will 
create an extra benefit.  However, as explained above, this could be of limited effect.  
First, the group of voluntary NSD-adopters is not negligible even today.  As a matter 
of fact, all big and many mid-sized platforms seems to integrate some type of 
automation already.  Unless the law is meant to push their existing solutions further 
in some way, there is no extra benefit derived from them.  Second, the group of non-
adopters which constitutes new potential implementers is likely to shrink under NSD.  
It is understandable that a new filtering condition will force some—mostly smaller 
players—to revisit their business models or exit regulated markets.  Third, the extra 
benefit derived from new NSD-implementers will depend on the previous 
enforcement under NTD.  As far as automation was already used to generate notices 
by right holders on those services, the benefits are limited by quality and capability 
of prescribed technologies.  This means that it is rather right holders who did not use 
automation before that are likely to see significant spike in detection—provided that 
they are interested.  For other right holders, the crucial benefit is then transfer of the 
enforcement costs onto intermediaries. 
 
 
 
 114. Lauinger et al., supra note 8787, at 8. 
 115. For website-blocking research, see Brett Danaher et al., The Effect of Piracy Website Blocking 
on Consumer Behavior (Carnegie Mellon Univ. Working Paper, Nov. 2015), https://perma.cc/Q9SV-
TCXT.  See also Brett Danaher & Michael D. Smith, Gone in 60 Seconds:  The Impact of the Megaupload 
Shutdown on Movie Sales, 33 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1 (2014).  
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 Extra Costs Extra Benefits 
Switch from 
NTD to NSD 
(C1) Over-use of automation:  
(a) compliance costs, (b) collateral 
over-blocking or (c) manual review 
 
(C2) Platform concentration:  
(a) competition, (b) innovation 
(B1) Blocking from new 
NSD-implementers 
 
It is hard to put numbers on the categories of costs and benefits which we have 
discussed. However, that is not my point here.  A well-intended legislator would 
propose a switch from NTD to NSD only if the problems that it tries to address in 
the existing system are impossible to solve otherwise, while promises of the new 
system are substantial to offset its expected costs.  In my view, this is not what we 
observe here.  Rather, mere standardization or enhancement of NTD with a view of 
automation offers important solutions to some of the existing inefficiencies. 
Looking at the main benefits of NSD, it is clear that blocking content before it is 
aired online is something that cannot be achieved on all the platforms without 
prescribing a staydown obligation.  However, as the discussion in Part 1.B has 
shown, even under NTD, many market players are likely to develop such systems 
voluntarily.  This means that the legislator needs to focus on the benefits from the 
pool of previous non-adopters, taking into account how such group will shrink as a 
response to staydown obligation.  As suggested in Part 1.B, non-cooperated bilateral 
filtering can achieve comparable results as unilateral filtering forced by staydown.  It 
requires, however, proper market for high-quality filtering technologies which is 
only possible if the entire procedure is better standardized and thus better scalable.  
This means that expected new benefits have to be also compared with the set of new 
opportunities still existing within NTD. 
And this brings us to an interesting realization.  When one looks at the structure 
of the costs and benefits, there is something very interesting about them.  They all 
depend on the state of technology (T) as defined by its price (p) and quality (q). 
 
 Extra Costs Extra Benefits 
Switch from 
NTD to NSD 
(C1*T) Over-use of automation:  
(a) compliance costs, (b) collateral 
over-blocking or (c) manual 
review 
 
(C2*T) Platform concentration:  
(a) competition, (b) innovation 
(B1*T) Ex ante blocking 
from new NSD-implementers 
 
First of all, the number of new implementers and the associated benefits (B1) 
depends on state of technology (T) under NTD.  If such technology is cheap and of 
high quality already under NTD, most of the platforms have likely implemented it 
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already since it saves them processing costs.  There are very few non-adopters and 
the switch to NSD thus delivers smaller benefits.  Thus, the more superior state of 
technology (T), the lower extra benefits from NSD (B1).  Second, the state of 
technology (T) also influences the social costs (C1; C2).  The worse the state of 
technology—higher costs or error rate—the higher the number of firms exiting the 
market (C2a) or going to innovate elsewhere (C2b) and the costs of over-use of 
automation (C1).  Thus ironically, the lower the costs and error rate of filtering, the 
higher would be their adoption also on the voluntary basis and thus again lower 
would be the benefit from new implementers.  In other words, if technology is good 
and affordable, right holders and intermediaries will use it if exposed to the 
magnitude of the problem. Legally prescribing creates no new efficiencies.  It only 
transfers the enforcement costs.  
This shows that the state of filtering technology defined by its price and quality is 
crucial.  If this is the case, then we should be interested in maximizing it (T) as a 
primary goal.  I conclude that better incentives to develop automation exist under 
NTD due to homogenous interest of market players.  Moreover, NTD provides firms 
with strong incentives to adopt existing automating technologies since it saves them 
resources.  So how to best get to those technologies quickly? 
B. THE CASE FOR STANDARDIZATION 
In order to incentivize superior technologies, we need to consider the markets for 
filtering services.  At the moment, they are fragmented, often not sufficiently 
scalable, and lack reasons to hone their precision.  To remedy these structural 
problems, I would suggest two areas of intervention:  (1) standardization of the notice 
and takedown; and (2) creation of a more targeted incentive structure for the 
development of new high-quality filtering technologies. 
As suggested above, today’s problem is not that the law does not mandate 
automation.  Automation is frequently used.  It rather seems to be the fact that it is 
often of very low quality and right holders cannot always fully take advantage of 
their automated tools due to fragmentation, low-quality meta-data, or obstructive 
notice submission systems.116  Therefore, what needs to be facilitated is a submission 
of high quality algorithmically generated notices, also called robo-notices or auto-
notices, so that intermediaries who produce high externalities cannot avoid getting 
them back through the large number of notices received (a boomerang effect).  
However, the technological design of interfaces for such robo-notices should 
incorporate incentives for development and use of high-quality technologies, not just 
any technologies.117  This should also prevent strategic behavior by right holders and 
intermediaries. 
As long as enforcement agents are only motivated to notify as much as possible, 
regardless of the precision, automation is waste of everyone’s resources.  Innovation 
 
 116. There are many ways automated submission can be obstructed, e.g. by notice caps per right 
holders, limiting submission on IP addresses, etc.  For more discussion on former submission caps in 
Google services, see Seng, supra note 5, at 416. 
 117. Seng notices that targets can incentivize better technologies too. See id. at 417. 
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in the area of detection technologies needs to be channeled to solutions which have 
negligible margin of error (technical and legal).  If such a solution can transform 
infringements to A-Types, automation should be encouraged.  Unless automation of 
infringements is not doing better than a trained human expert would, it constitutes 
no improvement of affairs.  Such infringements are NYA-Types and should be kept 
away from the full automated submission and review until the technology gets better 
to at least supersede humans. 
This choice between automation and regular options can be facilitated.  For 
instance, the law could prescribe an obligation of intermediaries to provide for a 
submission interface for machine readable notices of right holders (e.g. to receive 
XML submissions).  Such interface and its conditions could then be further specified 
by means of standardization.  This interface would have a two-fold function.  The 
intermediaries cannot restrict the free flow of justified notices regarding infringing 
content and right holders are able to scale their submission efforts depending on the 
limits of the currently available technology.  However, the standardized conditions 
should only reward by the type of automation that is wished from the social 
perspective—one with negligible false positives.  Such submission should not be 
available for NYA-Types.  And since the state of technology defines which those 
are, the better and more accurate the technology available, the more infringing 
activity on the service can be flagged automatically. 
Such a solution creates a market for filtering on both sides—among intermediaries 
as well as right holders.  It allows accommodating automation into the enforcement 
framework progressively, as it develops and improves.  This way the right holders 
and intermediaries can be motivated to use automation for A-Types, and manual 
review or semi-automation with manual review for NYA-Types.  Where solutions of 
both parties consider a content an A-Type, a single stream of automated enforcement 
is created (see Scenario 4).  This data flow then emulates the effects of staydown, 
with two differences.  It does not (1) take place on the upload level, but only after 
the content is published, and (2) it does not relieve right holders from incurring the 
costs.  However, both issues can be agreed upon in voluntary agreements to 
completely replicate staydown.  And the cheaper the technology, the more likely 
these are to materialize. 
To design such optimal incentives, the NTD frameworks should spell out several 
conditions for automated submission.  First, it should be available only to those right 
holders whose identity is verified.  This is to prevent fraudulent submissions by 
increasing accountability.  Second, machine submission should be allowed only if 
algorithms generate a negligible number of false positives.  The exact number should 
be informed by empirical evidence of what is currently possible to achieve,118 and 
could be further reduced with technological progress.  The benchmark can be initially 
drawn from average human error.  Third, an intermediary should have the possibility 
to suspend or punish for inflow of robo-notices from a particular right holder if the 
margin of error was overstepped.  This way, right holder themselves pressure 
 
 118. Seng reported that there are companies who already achieving a margin of error below 1% in 
the current average Trusted Copyright Removal Program of Google.  See id. at 417. 
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enforcement agents for quality.  Transparency would then facilitate competition on 
the merits.  Fourth, the same sanction should be applicable to inaccuracies in the 
meta-data concerning protected objects. 
Legally speaking, in the European Union, such standardization could be 
developed under the so-called New Approach.119  The E-Commerce Directive could 
foresee standardization for robo-notices with the basic criteria of:  (1) authentication; 
(2) negligible false positives; and (3) suspension-sanction mechanism.  In the 
European Union, the European Commission recently came up with the idea to 
propose fast-lanes for so called trusted flaggers who are defined as “an individual or 
entity which is considered by a hosting service provider to have particular expertise 
and responsibilities for the purposes of tackling illegal content online.”120  This could 
be used to condition such fast-lanes upon the quality of notifications.121  In the United 
States, DMCA could anticipate separate robo-notice fast-lanes attached with the 
same set of conditions.  
To illustrate how this system could work, imagine the infringing ecosystem 
around cyberlockers such as BitShare or Megaupload.  Cyberlockers are services that 
enable users to upload content and share it as links with third parties, who can 
download it at any time.  According to a recent study,122 approximately 70% of the 
revenue of those providing direct download services comes from users payments for 
a premium account, and 30% from advertising on their websites.123  On average, they 
enjoy a 63.4% profit ratio.124  If right holders could not only use scanning 
technologies to target infringing content, as they do today, but also algorithmically 
generate and submit notices under a uniform mandatory protocol to all the 
cyberlockers, they could significantly scale and speed-up the notice submission.  As 
a consequence, cyberlockers would be exposed to more processing costs to the point 
that their margins are reduced significantly, especially after users at the same time 
start to quit their services. 
Even if such cyberlockers decide to take the content down without any evaluation, 
they cannot escape certain consequences.  Provided that the technologies used by 
 
 119. With the Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a New Approach to technical harmonization 
and standards, the primary responsibility for creating European standards was given to the following 
organizations: CEN-CENELEC and ETSI.  This framework creates incentives and opportunities for 
private companies to participate in the standards development activities.  Under the New Approach, the 
regulatory function of the European Commission and Council is limited to specification of the so-called 
‘essential requirements.’  These refer to crucial requirements in terms of health, safety, environmental and 
consumer protection requirements.  The law then delegates the standards development to three selected 
SDOs (ETSI, CEN, CENELEC) and equips them with some legal effects. 
 120. European Commission, Commission Recommendation on Measures to Effectively Tackle 
Illegal Content Online, at ¶. 4(g) C(2018) 1177 final (Jan. 3, 2018), 
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=50095. 
 121. Arguably, those constitute very ‘clear and objective conditions for determining which 
individuals or entities [intermediaries] consider as trusted flaggers.’  Id. at ¶ 26. 
 122. Digital Citizens Alliance & Net Names, Behind the Cyberlocker Door:  A Report on How 
Shadowy Cyberlocker Businesses Use Credit Card Companies to Make Millions (2014), 
https://perma.cc/P7PV-V6N3 . 
 123. Id. at 3. 
 124. Id. at 28. 
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right holders are good enough, they could substantially shorten the life-expectancy 
of the infringing content,125 which, surprisingly, is currently several weeks.126  Short 
lived infringing content would severely endanger the business models of ‘bad 
players’ and the comfort of their customers.  Moreover, the right holders would be 
motivated to minimize the number of false positives, since if automated submission 
creates more than their negligible amount, cyberlockers could temporarily terminate 
this option, thus leaving the right holders with only regular human submission 
process, which is difficult to scale.  In this way, the right holders themselves push 
for better technologies that can distinguish A-Types and NYA-Types and reserve the 
latter for the regular submission process.  Within the regular submission process, 
false allegations should expose the right holders to small assignable monetary 
statutory penalties to improve the quality of submission.127 
Naturally, there is an information problem associated with determining instances 
and the overall rate of false positives.  The infringement cannot be always established 
with complete certainty.  This problem is especially significant for individual 
instances of infringements.  It is, however, less problematic for establishing the 
overall rate of false positives, where the count is averaged over a selected period of 
time.  Moreover, since the decision to punish by suspending the access to an 
automated interface lies with the intermediaries, if there is too much uncertainty 
about the exact rate of false positives, they may trigger the suspension at any arbitrary 
higher rate than the prescribed one.  After all, the law does not force them to use this 
option.  However, since lower quality of submission eats into resources in the long-
run, it might be profitable to invest in disciplining the ecosystem.  To prevent 
strategic behavior of intermediaries, its misuse could be sanctioned too. 
Alternatively, some types of intermediaries could also be pushed further to 
Scenario 5, in which not only standardization is imposed on the enforcement chain, 
but also API-interfaces with a direct conditional access for right holders.  Such 
interface could then embody the quality-control conditions discussed above so that 
it assures use of high-quality automation for A-Types and otherwise human judgment 
for NYA-Types.  It could also create more room for transparency since the 
interaction of right holders and intermediaries could be structured and even made 
partly available to public, or at least semi-public for researchers.  Such APIs should 
allow use of different technologies in order to benefit from competition on their 
 
 125. Today, the most significant problem is that the existing scheme cannot be sufficiently scaled to 
target all or even most of the content.  As a consequence, the notice and take-down make content short-
lived when notices are sent, but for the content which is never notified (unnoticed content), the life-
expectancy is surprisingly long and usually terminated by the services themselves.  See Lauinger et al., 
supra note 8787. 
 126. Lauinger et al. observed in their study that “on some OCHs, more pirated files appear to be 
deleted due to expiry rather than because of takedown requests”.  See id. at 7.  It is clear that the problem 
of enforcement is not those infringements that were notified, but those that could not be notified due to 
enforcement budget restraints.  It is these infringements that stay longer on the platforms and harm right 
holders.  The only way to cope with this is to institute a system where right holders can better scale their 
enforcement efforts against all the players at once.  This is exactly what is proposed in this work. 
 127. For instance, one can think of coupling ex-post ADR with fines for providers, which could be 
partly reclaimed by intermediaries against the notifiers who have issued false requests.  See Fiala & 
Husovec, supra note 113.  
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quality.  However, giving direct pre-publication access to right holders could lend 
them too much power in the distribution process.  Needless to say, any changes have 
to be implemented in a way that respect fundamental rights. 
One of the advantages of the standardization approach, compared to NSD, is that 
it enables individualized enforcement by right holders.  This is because right holders 
on their own decide whether they want to keep particular content on-line if it is 
infringing, whether they want to endorse infringing behavior, monetize it or curb it 
by blocking it completely.  Unlike under NSD, they can do it not only on a work-
level, but also a use-level.  The automated submission interface can also easily 
accommodate further functions, such as the possibility for right holders to accept or 
reject certain monetization offers by an intermediary.128  This could be a great source 
of innovative services from agents who would analyze the potential income and make 
such decisions for right holders algorithmically. 
Under such standardized NTD, right holders and intermediaries are encouraged 
to find and develop new scanning technologies that can automate more submission 
with very few false positives.  The possibilities of scale and speed of submission 
would create new market opportunities and also competition among infringement 
management services.  Their services should thus become more affordable for 
smaller right holders in the long run. The government can further support 
development of high-quality technologies through subsidies or prizes. 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The analysis shows that automation is inevitable.  High-quality automation of 
copyright enforcement that produces negligible enforcement errors offers many 
opportunities and therefore should be embraced and incentivized.  However, we need 
to push innovation in the right direction.  In comparing two policy options, the 
standardized NTD process promotes automation better than NSD because it provides 
for stronger market incentives for the development of new filtering technologies and 
allows area-by-area introduction as the technologies progress.  Moreover, NTD 
preserves individualized enforcement.  As a consequence, standardized NTD is a 
superior policy option.  Any processing of algorithmically generated notices should 
always be conditional upon their quality which should, at the very least, supersede 
human experts in their precision.  For the policy makers, this means that staydown 
obligations should be replaced by policies seeking further global harmonization, 
standardization, and enhancement of notice and takedown process by creating 
conditional robo-notice submission-lanes that incentivize high quality automation.  
To further accelerate this transition, governments could also stimulate investment in 
meta-data collection and development of new technologies in order to make them 
accessible also to small rights holders and small platforms. 
 
 128. Symphonic is a service which checks video content beyond those caught by ContentID, and 
helps to further monetize the content.  For further information on the service, visit Symphonic’s website 
at https://perma.cc/QK3P-ZWLF. 
